Nothing but the cuckoo clock? Determinants of public funding of culture in Switzerland, 1977–2010 by Rössel, Jörg & Weingartner, Sebastian
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2015
Nothing but the cuckoo clock? Determinants of public funding of culture in
Switzerland, 1977–2010
Rössel, Jörg; Weingartner, Sebastian
Abstract: Sociology of culture has established knowledge about the social processes in the production,
valuation and consumption of cultural objects and the arts. However, public spending on culture is
predominantly studied in political science and political economy. Therefore, the aim of this article is to
add a sociological view to existing political and economic examinations of public funding of culture and
arts. This is pursued by concentrating on the determinants of public cultural expenditures, which we
consider as comprising not only political (party ideology, electoral cycle, direct democracy) and economic
(central locations, spatial spending patterns) but also social factors (population’s structure according
to education, income, age). This interdisciplinary approach is based on the idea that cultural policy is
located at the intersection of political decision-making, cultural production, and cultural consumption.
Empirically, we study cultural expenditures and their determinants for the 26 cantons of Switzerland
from 1977 to 2010 based on hybrid panel regression models. Our results show that the Swiss cantons
exhibit strikingly different patterns of cultural expenditure. Consistent with our main assumption, they
are shaped by social, political and economic-geographic variables. Yet, the interplay of these variables
differs between classical cultural expenditures and public funding of sports and leisure.
DOI: 10.1016/j.poetic.2015.02.007
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-110070
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Rössel, Jörg; Weingartner, Sebastian (2015). Nothing but the cuckoo clock? Determinants of public
funding of culture in Switzerland, 1977–2010. Poetics, 49:43-59. DOI: 10.1016/j.poetic.2015.02.007
Nothing but the Cuckoo Clock? Determinants of Public Funding of Culture in 
Switzerland 1977 - 20101 
Jörg Rössel and Sebastian Weingartner 
 
Abstract 
Sociology of culture has established knowledge about the social processes in the production, 
valuation and consumption of cultural objects and the arts. However, public spending on 
culture is predominantly studied in political science and political economy. Therefore, the aim 
of this article is to add a sociological view to existing political and economic examinations of 
public funding of culture and arts. This is pursued by concentrating on the determinants of 
public cultural expenditures, which we consider as comprising not only political (party 
ideology, electoral cycle, direct democracy) and economic (central locations, spatial spending 
patterns) but also social factors (population’s structure according to education, income, age). 
This interdisciplinary approach is based on the idea that cultural policy is located at the 
intersection of political decision making, cultural production, and cultural consumption. 
Empirically, we study cultural expenditures and their determinants for the 26 cantons of 
Switzerland from 1977 to 2010 based on hybrid panel regression models. Our results show 
that the Swiss cantons exhibit strikingly different patterns of cultural expenditure. Consistent 
with our main assumption they are shaped by social, political and economic-geographic 
variables. Yet, the interplay of these variables differs between classical cultural expenditures 
and public funding of sports and leisure.     
 
 
1. Introduction 
Sociology of culture has established knowledge about social processes in the production, 
valuation and consumption of cultural objects and the arts. The social and economic situation 
of art producers and their organization is a thriving field of research (Becker 1982; DiMaggio 
1987; Menger 1999; Dubois/Francois 2013; Lena/Lindemann 2014; Lachmann/Pain/Gauna 
2014), the functioning of art markets is covered not only by economists, but also by 
sociologists of culture (Velthuis 2004; Beckert/Rössel 2013). Furthermore, sociologists have 
1 We owe this title to Kevin Mulcahy, who alluded us to the famous remark added by Orson Welles to the script 
of the movie “The Third Man”: “You know what the fellow said – in Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, 
they had warfare, terror, murder and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the 
Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred years of democracy and peace – and 
what did that produce? The cuckoo clock”. Actually Switzerland is not the origin of the cuckoo clock, it 
originates from the black forest in Germany.  
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studied the valuation of cultural objects and their consecration by different powerful actors in 
the respective fields (Bourdieu 1999; Verboord/van Rees 2008; Dowd 2011; Dubois/Francois 
2013). Most elaborate, yet, is the analysis of cultural consumption; be that patterns and main 
dimensions of cultural participation, the different modes of cultural consumption, or its socio-
structural basis (Bourdieu 1984; Roose et al. 2012; Savage/Prieur 2011; Rössel 2011; Katz-
Gerro 2011). However, the role of state institutions in evaluating and supporting culture 
seems to be less prominent in the sociological literature. Even though there is some research 
on the canonization of culture in textbooks and in the school curriculum (Verboord/van Rees 
2008; Bevers 2005), support and public spending in the field of culture have not been under 
much consideration from a sociological perspective (for an important exception: Feder/Katz-
Gerro 2012). Therefore, the aim of this contribution is to add a sociological view to existing 
political and economic examinations of public funding of culture and arts and thus contribute 
to a genuine interdisciplinary explanation of cultural policy.  
Cultural policy, whose basic component is granting public subsidies for cultural projects, is 
located at the intersection of different societal fields and thus the result of an interplay of a 
multitude of actors ruled by different institutions. It is directly connected with political 
decision making processes and with cultural producers’ supply opportunities; but it is also, 
probably mutually and less directly, tied to the demands of (potential) cultural consumers. 
Hence, determinants of public cultural spending should be analyzed from several theoretical 
perspectives as they comprise not only political but also social and economic factors. Our 
strategy, then, is to augment previous research on public cultural spending stemming from 
political science and political economy with discussions about the socio-structural bases of 
cultural consumption. This results in an interdisciplinary aggregation of social, political, and 
economic determinants which we assume to be most relevant for the explanation of public 
cultural expenditure in the present study (section 2). More specifically, we will focus our 
attention on the population’s educational, income, and age structure as well as political 
institutions like parties, electoral cycles, and direct democratic alternatives. Moreover, we 
take account of central locations and spatial spending patterns as discussed in economic 
geography. Based on these considerations we derive hypotheses guiding our empirical study. 
After discussing our methods and presenting the available data in section 3 we present the 
empirical results with respect to our hypotheses in section 4. Basically our results underline 
our main assumption: public spending for culture results from a complex interplay of social 
structures, political institutions and economic-geographic patterns.  
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We study the determinants of cultural expenditure for the case of Switzerland from 1977 to 
2010. Previous research has shown that the causal mechanisms that shape public spending are 
highly context sensitive. The party difference hypothesis for example predicts that left wing 
parties and their supporters advocate more generous public spending (Hibbs 1977; Wagschal 
2006: 70). However, depending on the country context parties seem to matter not at all for 
cultural expenditure, in some cases left wing parties and their supporters tend to further it 
whereas in other countries right wing parties and their supporters back such funding 
(Schulz/Rose 1998; Getzner 2004a; Noonan 2007; Lewis/Rushton 2007; Potrafke 2010a; 
2010b; Dalle Nogare et al. 2011; Benito et al. 2013). Therefore, empirical research on the 
explanation of cultural expenditure has to focus on the context of specific cases. As a rather 
small, federal country with strong institutions of direct democracy, Switzerland provides an 
important supplementary instance for research on cultural expenditure. It is generally assumed 
that public spending is lower in federal compared to unitary countries (Wagschal 2006). 
However, more recent research has shown that federalism also increases rent-seeking 
behavior (Obinger et al. 2005; Wagschal 2006). The federal structure of Switzerland is of 
prime importance for our study, because it enables us to compare the relevance of political 
institutions in 26 cantons. In particular, Switzerland is an important test case for analyzing the 
role of direct democracy for cultural expenditure. Since there is a world-wide spreading of 
institutions of direct democracy (Scarrow 2001; Setala/Schiller 2009), the Swiss experience 
may enable us to draw some lessons for other countries based on our study.  
As a federal and rather liberal country Switzerland relies on a principle of double subsidiarity 
with respect to cultural expenditure: firstly, culture should be supported by private actors, 
which is stimulated by tax relief. Secondly, public spending for culture should be on the 
municipal and cantonal (i.e. state) level (Schwab/Surdez 2007).2 However, private spending 
accounts with 15–20% of all expenditures for only a small part of financial support for 
culture. Most public spending does indeed take place at the municipal and cantonal level (85 
%). In our study we aggregate municipal and cantonal spending at the cantonal level and 
thereby grasp the bulk of public cultural spending. This federalist framework of cultural 
expenditure is an advantage for our analysis since it allows for the incorporation of regional 
specificities in electorate composition and political institutions. These, in turn, should 
correspond more with regional than national political outcomes (Getzner 2004a). Similar to 
Armingeon et al (2004), who find a multiplicity of “Swiss Worlds of Welfare” in the different 
cantons, we expect to find different spending patterns in the 26 Swiss cantons. Therefore, our 
2 The 26 cantons are the member states of the federal state of Switzerland.  
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focus on the subnational level enables us to follow 26 historical trajectories over time. In 
contrast to the sometimes stereotypic internal and external perception of Switzerland 
culminating in the mythical image of a rural country of alpine herdsmen catering to alpine 
tourists (Siegenthaler 1992), we want to deconstruct this idyllic image and demonstrate the 
diversity of culture and cultural policy in the different Swiss cantons.  Since the cantons also 
differ strongly with respect to economic and social structures, we are able to compare the 
determinants of spending between the cantons and over time. One specific characteristic of 
Switzerland are the institutions of direct democracy, which have supposedly strong impact on 
public spending levels (Kirchgässner 2010; Schaltegger 2001). Since direct democracy varies 
in strength between the cantons, we are able to systematically study its impact on cultural 
expenditure. Similar to federalism, it is argued that direct democracy brings preferences of the 
electorate and political decisions more into correspondence (Potrafke 2010b; Kirchgässner 
2010). Therefore, the Swiss case enables us not only to study the relevance of political 
institutions for the explanation of cultural expenditure patterns, but the conditions of 
federalism and direct democracy should lead to a high relevance of electoral preferences for 
budgetary decisions and thus makes the social structure of the cantonal populations crucial for 
explanation. Hence, the specific institutional situation in Switzerland increases the relevance 
of adding a sociological perspective to conventional explanations of public expenditure for 
culture.  
 
 
2. Theoretical approaches to explaining cultural expenditure 
In our basically interdisciplinary approach to explaining public expenditure for culture we 
rely on established theories in political science and political economy to develop hypotheses 
on the influence of political institutions, economic and geographic conditions (section 2.2. and 
2.3.) But beforehand we discuss social structure as a determinant for public spending to add a 
sociological contribution to the existing research literature (section 2.1).  
 
 
2.1. Demand and support for culture: the case for social structure 
We assume that the social structure of the population of a canton and thus the preferences of 
the electorate matter for budgetary decisions. This premise is based on two explanatory 
mechanisms: on the one hand we can expect the parties in a canton to compete for the 
available voters and thus to reflect the social structure of the electorate. This is similar to the 
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well-known median-voter model in political science (Downs 1957). In a federal system the 
electorate’s preferences should be particularly well represented by the cantonal parties. 
Furthermore the institutions of direct democracy enable it to enforce its preferences 
(Kirchgässner 2010; Potrafke 2010b). As Potrafke (2010b) has shown with respect to the 
decision to build a concert hall in Constance (Germany), representative democracy may lead 
to a decoupling between a party’s political behavior and its electorate’s preferences. In this 
case the left politicians voted for the concert hall, whereas their voters voted against the 
concert hall in a referendum. It was the other way round for the conservative parties. The 
institutionalization of direct democracy in the Swiss case should reduce this decoupling 
between the electorates preferences and the parties’ behavior, thus the social structure of the 
population and its preferences should matter strongly for budgetary decisions. Therefore, we 
expect groups, which have a preference for culture to support public spending for cultural 
issues. However, this would decrease the entrance fee for everybody and thus would provide 
culture and the arts for a larger share of the population. Feder and Katz-Gerro (2012) have 
termed this model the arts provision approach and contrasted it with the hegemony distinction 
perspective. In the latter it is assumed that the members of the arts audience prefer to restrict 
the supply of culture, to exclude large parts of the population from the access to distinctive 
high-brow culture. In their time series analysis of cultural funding in Israel they find empirical 
support for the arts provision approach with respect to theatres and orchestras, but with 
respect to opera the results point towards the hegemony distinction perspective. Hence, we 
have to take into account that social structure as such does not represent the preferences of the 
electorate; art lovers may support public funding for the arts, but they may also want to 
restrict access to it.  
From surveys of arts audiences and population surveys we know that cultural participation is 
more widespread among persons with higher education and higher income (Bourdieu 1984; 
Katz-Gerro 2011; Roose et al. 2012). Based on the arts provision model we should expect the 
proportion of persons with higher education in a canton to have a positive effect on public 
funding for the arts, whereas the hegemony distinction approach predicts the contrary. The 
same is true is for mean income levels in the canton. Surveys studying the attitudes towards 
public funding of the arts come to mixed results. Katz-Gerro (2012) finds that persons with 
higher education in the UK and the US support public funding for the arts, whereas income 
exhibits positive effects only in the UK. High income individuals in the US support public 
spending only when they are actually visitors themselves. In contrast Brooks (2001) finds for 
the US that high income and education have a positive effect on support for the arts, the 
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impact of education is however completely mediated by liberal ideology. Research on 
referenda on public spending for the arts leads to more clear-cut results: in general they find 
that electoral constituencies with a higher proportion of higher-educated persons and higher 
mean income tend to support public spending for the arts (Pommerehne 1982; 
Frey/Pommerehne 1995; Schulze/Ursprung 2000; Getzner 2004b; Rushton 2005). Finally, 
empirical analyses of the correlation between population characteristics and cultural 
expenditure come to somewhat mixed results. Most studies, with the exception of Schulze and 
Rose (1998), who find a negative effect, indicate a positive effect of income (Getzner 2002; 
2004; 2013; Lewis/Rushton 2007; Noonan 2007; Potrafke 2010a; Benito et al. 2013). With 
regard to educational levels some studies find the results predicted by the arts provision 
approach (Feder/Katz-Gerro 2012; Werck et al. 2013) whereas other studies find no or even a 
negative relationship (Schulze/Rose 1998; Noonan 2007; Bento et al. 2013). Summarizing, 
there is some support for the arts provision approach, although some studies indicate that the 
hegemony distinction perspective may be relevant for certain countries or cultural subgenres. 
In addition to the utility deriving from the consumption of cultural events some authors 
have argued that culture is also valued as legacy for subsequent generations (Pommerehne 
1982; Frey/Pommerehne 1995; Schulze/Ursprung 2000). Persons may prefer to support 
cultural institutions because they value the historical and cultural heritage of their country and 
thus want their society to pass on its culture to future generations. These considerations 
should of course be most important for persons with children. Thus, in cantons with a higher 
share of young persons (children and juveniles) cultural expenditure should be higher.  
However, the empirical results of previous studies are rather mixed: some show the expected 
pattern (Frey/Pommerehne 1995; Schulze/Ursprung 2000; Getzner 2004b), whereas others 
show no or even the contrary results (Noonan 2007; Dalle Nogare et al. 2011, Benito et al. 
2013). All in all, even though previous research could not generate unambiguous results, we 
can formulate the following unidirectional hypotheses concerning education, income, and age 
structure which are open to empirical scrutiny: 
 
H1a: The higher the share of persons with a tertiary education, the higher is cultural 
expenditure.  
H1b: The higher the mean income, the higher is cultural expenditure.  
H1c: The higher the share of young people, the higher is cultural expenditure.  
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2.2. Political institutions and direct democracy 
Our next step is to discuss established explanations of public expenditure focusing on political 
patterns. Here, we will discuss firstly, the party difference hypothesis, predicting differing 
political behavior between parties, secondly, the influence of the electoral cycle, and thirdly, 
as a Swiss specificity, the role of direct democratic institutions.  
The basic idea of the party difference hypothesis is that parties cater ideologically to different 
segments of the electorate: whereas left wing parties are linked to lower- and working class 
voters favoring public expenditure and redistribution, right wing parties represent middle and 
upper class voters opposing redistribution and public spending (Hibbs 1976; Wagschal 2007; 
Potrafke 2011). Empirically, however, this hypothesis rarely proved true in the realm of 
cultural expenditure. Most studies find no party effect at all (Getzner 2002; Noonan 2007; 
Potrafke 2011; Dalle Nogare et al. 2011; Werck et al. 2013; Benito et al. 2013). Some studies 
show that in some cases right-wing parties support public funding for the arts more than left-
wing parties, which is of course consistent with their middle- and upper-class electorate 
(Schulze/Rose 1998; Getzner 2004a; Potrafke 2010a). Furthermore, there is evidence that the 
political preferences of the electorate are of greater importance than the party ideologies 
(Getzner 2004b; Rushton 2005; Lewis/Rushton 2007; Potrafke 2010b; Dalle Nogare et al. 
2011). However, in some cases public spending for the arts is supported by left-wing voters, 
in others by right-wing voters. Based on these arguments we focus on the parties’ electoral 
share and not on their role as government parties.  
A further approach in political science connects government expenditure with a kind of 
political business cycle (Wagschal 2007; Benito et al. 2013; Dalle Nogare et al. 2011). This 
means that politicians strategically increase public spending prior to elections to boost the 
economy and please their voters. The empirical results for this thesis with respect to cultural 
expenditure have been quite mixed: Benito et al.  (2013) found the predicted effects, whereas 
Getzner’s study (2004a) established no significant results and Dalle Nogare et al. (2011) even 
found that public spending for culture is reduced before elections. Therefore, we are also 
going to test this hypothesis empirically for the Swiss case.  
Switzerland’s democratic system is characterized by rather strong institutions of direct 
democracy (Kirchgässner 2010). The fact that political decisions may be subject to a 
referendum may bring them more in line with the median voter, whereas in representative 
systems there may be a stronger decoupling of voter preferences and party behavior 
(Kirchgässner 2010; Potrafke 2010b). Voters in Switzerland exhibit a rather selective 
composition, since middle class and higher class persons are overrepresented, as well as older 
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and male individuals. Since communities and cantons have the right to tax, these groups may 
resist the increase of public spending and ensuing tax increases. Several studies have indeed 
shown that expected tax increases lead persons to vote against subsidies to the arts 
(Pommerehne 1982; Frey/Pommerehne 1995; Schulze/Ursprung 2000; Getzner 2004b). 
Therefore, direct democracy may reduce public expenditure in general (Schaltegger 2001; 
Kirchgässner 2010). Thus, we can expect that cantons with stronger institutions of direct 
democracy spend less on culture and the arts. Together with the remarks on parties and the 
electoral cycle outlined above we can derive three hypotheses respecting the political 
determinants of public cultural spending. 
  
H2a: The higher the share of conservative voters and the lower the share of left-wing voters, 
the higher is cultural expenditure. 
H2b: Before elections cultural expenditure increases. 
H2c: The stronger the institutions of direct democracy are in a canton, the lower is cultural 
expenditure.  
 
 
2.3. Economic and geographic conditions 
When talking of economic determinants we first have to take into account that budgetary 
decisions are usually constrained by the financial situation of a polity. There is strong 
evidence that current debts and tax revenues have an impact on spending decisions 
(Schulze/Rose 1998; Getzner 2004a; Lewis/Rushton 2007; Noonan 2007). That is why we 
include the individual cantons’ overall amount of tax revenues into our analysis. 
Furthermore, we refer to Heilbrun’s (1992) thesis that art and culture bear central place 
functions. Especially for the performing arts, but also for culture more generally, there exists a 
minimum market size to support the establishment of certain cultural institutions. Thus, larger 
museums, opera houses, concert halls and so on are usually located in large urban 
agglomerations (Heilbrun 1992; Schulze/Rose 1998; Werck et al. 2008). This location is 
supported by other economies of agglomeration, like thick labor markets for arts personnel 
and information spillover (Heilbrun 1992). This is of course only true for most cultural 
establishments, but need not be true for all like heritage sites (Waterton/Smith 2010). 
Furthermore, public spending for the arts has stronger support among people living closer to 
the cultural attractions, because they have lower travel costs (Pommerehne 1982; 
Frey/Pommerehne 1995; Schulze/Ursprung 2000; Getzner 2004b; Rushton 2005). Finally, 
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one can assume that especially larger conurbations have to spend on leisure and cultural 
amenities to attract creative workers (Florida 2005).  Despite the critical discussion of this 
thesis especially in cultural policy circles (McGuigan 2009) it has received some empirical 
support in further studies (Boschma/Fritsch 2009; Falck et al. 2010).  
However, it is not sufficient to treat communities in isolation from each other. It is well 
known in urban geography, that different municipalities are functionally linked to each other. 
A central location which spends a lot on cultural amenities is usually not able to exclude 
visitors from neighboring municipalities. When travel costs are low, which is true in a rather 
small country with excellent public transport like Switzerland, cantons may choose to free 
ride on the cultural expenditure of their neighboring canton. This has been demonstrated 
empirically for Flemish municipalities (Werck et al. 2008) and for Italian communities (Dalle 
Nogare et al. 2011).   
 
H3a: The higher the tax revenue of a canton, the higher is cultural expenditure. 
H3b: The larger the central location in a canton, the higher is cultural expenditure. 
H3c: The higher the cultural expenditure of neighboring cantons, the lower the cultural 
expenditure of a canton.  
 
Summarizing the theoretical approaches discussed, we expect a complex configuration of 
different determinants to shape public funding of the arts. Neither social structure alone, nor 
political institutions, nor geographic patterns seem to be the main determinants. However, a 
final assessment of this claim has to await our empirical study of public expenditure for 
culture in Switzerland between 1977 and 2010.  
 
 
3. Data, variables, and methods 
3.1. Data and variables 
Empirically testing our hypotheses we resort to aggregate information on the 26 Swiss 
cantons over time. The sources of data are manifold; however, most data are accessible 
through the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BfS). Additionally, we use information 
stemming from a comprehensive dataset on the “Quality of Democracy in the Swiss Cantons” 
which was collected and prepared at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern 
(Schaub/Dlabac 2012). Observing 26 cantons over 34 years leads to a panel data structure of 
points in time clustered into cantons, with an initial sample of 884 canton-years. However, not 
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all information needed for our analyses is available at every observational point, resulting in 
an unbalanced sample. Whenever feasible, we adopted linear interpolation techniques, but 
still not all missing data points could be remediated.  
All dependent variables denote public cultural spending. More precisely, we take into account 
the per capita cultural expenditures of each canton and the municipalities located in it 
(measured in 100 Swiss Francs (C CHF), inflation-adjusted to the year 2010). Official 
statistics differentiate between eight cultural domains publically funded, i.e. public 
expenditures for (1) concerts and theater, (2) museums and visual arts, (3) monument and 
cultural heritage preservation, (4) libraries, (5) media, (6) sports, (7) leisure, and (8) other 
cultural domains. We built three dependent variables differing according to the funded 
domains they include: overall cultural expenditures correspond to the sum of expenditures for 
all eight domains, classical cultural expenditures correspond to the sum of all domains but 
sports and leisure, and sports and leisure cultural expenditures correspond to the sum of only 
domains (6) and (7). The latter variable serves as a reference case to properly compare the 
determinants of cultural expenditure to a rather different spending category. Even though 
analyzing these three variables enables us to identify whether the determinants of public 
spending on culture vary by domain, the advantage of disentangling public cultural 
expenditures by domain can only be achieved in the period from 1990 onward. Prior to 1990 
official statistics on the cantonal level report only information on overall cultural 
expenditures, including sports and leisure. Therefore only the analysis of overall cultural 
expenditures will cover the whole observational period from 1977 to 2010, whereas analyses 
of the other dependent variables will be restricted to the period from 1990 to 2010.  
The list of determinants of cultural expenditures included in our models is geared to the 
hypotheses derived in section 2. 
To measure the educational level of a canton’s population we use the share of persons holding 
a tertiary degree. Analogously, the age level is operationalized by the share of persons 
between 0 and 25 years old. The per capita net aggregate income of private and public 
households and corporations (in 1’000 Swiss Francs (M CHF), inflation-adjusted to the year 
2010) will serve as an indicator for the income level of a canton. These three parameters can 
be thought of as reflecting the social-structural determinants relevant for public spending on 
culture (H1a – H1c). 
An important political determinant is the strength of political parties. Here we take into 
account Switzerland’s four major political parties, which are the SP (social-democratic party), 
the CVP (christian-democratic party), the FDP (liberal party), and the SVP (right-wing party). 
10 
 
For each canton and year we determined the share of every party in the cantonal parliaments. 
These shares can be interpreted as indicators of the electoral support of these parties in the 
cantonal population (H2a). The impact of electoral cycles (H2b) will be analyzed by calculating 
for every canton and year the time span in years between the current observation and the next 
cantonal election to come. To have a measure for the strength of direct democratic institutions 
in each canton (H2c) we use an index developed by Stutzer (1999), ranging from 1 to 6, with 
higher values indicating a stronger development of direct democratic rights. Since here the 
focus is on public expenditures we concentrate on the so called financial referendum, which is 
one of four sub-indices of the composite index for direct democratic rights (also Frey/Stutzer 
2000). The index was prepared and calculated for most years between 1970 and 2010 by 
Schaub and Dlabac (2012). Finally, there are three variables indicating economic and 
geographic determinants. One determinant of public cultural expenditures is the per capita tax 
revenue of each canton and all the municipalities located in it (in C CHF, inflation-adjusted to 
the year 2010; H3a). Another is the number of inhabitants of the largest municipality of a 
canton in a certain year, which we use as an indicator for the size of a canton’s central 
location (H3b). The final determinant taken account of here is the amount of cultural 
expenditure of neighboring cantons (H3c). We include this in our models by calculating a 
simple spatial lag term of the form 
𝑊𝑊 × 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable in question at time 𝑖𝑖 and canton 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑊𝑊 is a 26×26-
matrix of the Swiss cantons, containing 1 when two cantons share a common border and 0 
otherwise, each row divided by the number of 1-values of that row (cf. Beck et al 2006; for 
more complex applications in cultural expenditure research see Nogare/Galizzi 2011, Werck 
et al. 2008). Interpretatively, this term boils down to the mean of cultural expenditures of a 
canton’s neighboring cantons in each year. Since the term is sensitive to the cultural domain 
of the dependent variable there are three different terms, each one specific to one of the three 
models computed. 
 
 
3.2. Analytical strategy and model specification 
Two classical approaches to exploit the panel data structure described above in a multivariate 
fashion are either fixed- or random-effects models. Both aim at managing the two possible 
sources of variability of public cultural expenditures emerging in such a setting: differences 
between the cantons and differences within each canton over time. The advantage of fixed-
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effects models is that the differences between cantons at every observational point are kept 
constant, so that each canton at time points ¬𝑖𝑖 serves as its own control case for time point 𝑖𝑖. 
Thus, all unobserved time-constant factors are controlled for when calculating the effects of 
time-varying determinants. However, the disadvantage of this strategy is that time-constant 
determinants would have to be excluded from the analysis and that only the intra-cantonal 
effects (within- or over-time-effects) can be estimated. The first disadvantage is of no 
practical relevance here since all independent variables are time-varying. The second, though, 
is quite problematic in our application since it would not be possible to figure out whether 
certain cantonal characteristics determine the differences in cultural spending between the 
cantons, but only within the single cantons over time. Random-effects-models, on the other 
hand, allow the inclusion of time constant independent variables and, more importantly, the 
additional estimation of effects cantonal characteristics have on the inter-cantonal differences 
in cultural spending. This is crucial when thinking of the amount of cultural spending in 
canton 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑖𝑖 as being the result of two different influential pathways: On the one hand, 
this amount is due to fact that it is observed in one canton with specific structural, political, 
economic and geographical characteristics but not in another (between-effect). On the other 
hand, it is also due to the fact that it is observed in each canton separately at a specific point in 
time and not at another (within-/over-time-effect). However, when using ordinary random-
effects models it is not possible to discriminate between the within- and between-component 
of the effects since only composite effects can be calculated.  
This serious disadvantage of random-effects models can be remedied by a procedure proposed 
by Allison (2009: 23ff) whose main objective is to combine both fixed- and random-effects 
approaches to a so called hybrid approach (see also Halaby 2004). Therefore, to decompose 
the between- and within-component of its effect on cultural expenditures, we calculate the 
canton-mean of every independent variable over all available years (?̅?𝑥∙𝑖𝑖) and the deviation 
from this mean at each point in time (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥∙𝑖𝑖). Integrating both components into an ordinary 
random-effects model instead of the original variables yields the full effect of each 
determinant but divided into its between- and within-component. This model takes on the 
general form of  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥∙𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏?̅?𝑥∙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 is the within-component of the effect of variable 𝑘𝑘, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 is the between-component 
of the effect of variable 𝑘𝑘, 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖  is the canton-specific residual, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the canton-year-specific 
residual. In this way it is possible to detect whether the influence of an independent variable 
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on cultural expenditures is due to the intra-cantonal development of the respective variable 
over time or to its more static differences between the cantons. Hence, we implement the 
decomposition procedure described for all determinants of cultural spending but two: the time 
span between the current observation and the next cantonal election and the spatial lag term of 
neighboring cantons. We do this because the former is in itself directed to over-time-effects 
and the latter to between-canton effects. Keeping this in mind and integrating the spatial lag 
term of (1) into (2), leads to the following final model, 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑤𝑤�𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥1∙𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽1𝑏𝑏?̅?𝑥1∙𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽11𝑤𝑤 �𝑥𝑥11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥11∙𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽11𝑏𝑏 ?̅?𝑥11∙𝑖𝑖 +  
 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
which we apply to the three dependent variables. In this way it is possible to estimate both the 
inter- and intra-cantonal influence of all above mentioned social, political, and economic 
determinants on public cultural spending within one model. Not shown in equation (3) but 
also included in the actual estimations are dummy-variables for each observational year in 
order to control for possible period effects. This is necessary particularly to avoid biased 
within-/over-time-coefficients.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive information 
We start analyzing cultural policies by descriptively inspecting the development of cultural 
expenditures. Looking at figure 1 one can easily recognize that overall cultural spending rose 
strongly from the seventies until 1990, then descended slightly, and remained at a quite stable 
level until the beginning of the new millennium. Yet, from 2005 onward, a renewed increase 
of overall cultural expenditures is observable. This finding is true not only for expenditures in 
absolute but also in per capita terms. However, the finding is not necessarily true for all 
cultural domains. Spending on sports and leisure did profit very much from the overall 
increase in the early 2000s., from 2008 onward it rather seems to go down slightly. Hence, the 
overall increase at the end of our observational period is mainly due to classical cultural 
expenditures (esp. museums, visual arts, libraries, cultural heritage); though not to all 
components of classical expenditures (not depicted individually).  
The descriptive examination so far showed that there are considerable differences in cultural 
spending in Switzerland over time, with contrasting developments for the different cultural 
domains. In order to additionally give a provisional picture of the cantonal variations, figures 
2 to 4 depict the three cultural expenditure variables for all cantons for the year 2010, both in 
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absolute and per capita terms. Firstly, looking at overall cultural expenditures, the canton of 
Zurich (ZH) turns out to exhibit by far the largest amount of spending in absolute terms, 
followed by the cantons of Geneva (GE), Vaud (VD), and Bern (BE). These are the cantons 
with the highest numbers of inhabitants. The lowest amounts of absolute cultural expenditures  
 
Figure 1: Cultural expenditures of all Swiss cantons and their municipalities, 1977-2010. 
 
can be found in the small cantons, like Glarus (GL), Nidwalden (NW), Uri (UR) or 
Appenzell-Innerrhoden (AI). The picture, though, changes somewhat, when focusing on per 
capita spending. Then, the highest amounts can be found in the most densely populated and 
urbanized cantons like the city of Basel (City of Basel, BS) and Geneva. But also more rural 
cantons like Obwalden (OW) or Grisons (GR) are suddenly part of the “top league”. So, when 
comparing cantons with each other, it indeed makes a big difference whether one concentrates 
on absolute or per capita cultural expenditures. In the multivariate analyses the focus will be 
on per capita spending, since this relative measure seems to give the more valid information 
on cultural expenditure in a canton.  
The next step is to investigate how cultural spending with respect to the two sub-domains  
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 Figure 2: Overall cultural expenditures of the Swiss cantons and their municipalities in 
2010. 
 
differs between cantons (figures 3 and 4). Again, Obwalden (OW) serves as an interesting 
example. As seen above, this canton shows a high level of overall per capita cultural 
expenditures. Contrasting figures 3 and 4, then, reveals that this is mostly by virtue of 
spending on sports and leisure. With regard to per capita spending for classical culture  
Obwalden is even among the ten cantons spending least. This is probably due to the fact that 
this canton, located in central Switzerland, is more famous for its qualities in alpinism and 
tourism than in offering classical (highbrow) cultural events, thus confirming the stereotypical 
image of Switzerland depicted in the introduction.  
Just the opposite picture can be observed when taking a look at the canton of the city of Basel 
(BS). There, classical per capita expenditures are highest among all cantons (figure 3), 
whereas sports and leisure expenditures are on an average level (figure 4). The former is 
mostly by virtue of spending for concerts and theater and, even more striking, for museums 
and visual arts (not depicted). Particularly in the domain of museums and visuals arts Basel by 
far exceeds all other cantons in per capita spending. Based on this evidence one can not only   
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 Figure 3: Classical cultural expenditures (all but sports and leisure) of the Swiss cantons 
and their municipalities in 2010. 
 
understand why Basel is Switzerland’s “capital” when it comes to the production, trading, and 
consumption of visual arts but also why “Art Basel” became one of the world’s most 
important platform for contemporary art. In comparison, Geneva which exhibits the second 
highest amount of classical cultural expenditures shows also a fairly high level of spending 
for sports and leisure. In the end, this leads to the result that Geneva has the highest amount of 
overall per capita cultural spending in Switzerland.  
So far we can conclude that the initial situation to study cultural expenditures in Switzerland 
is quite multifaceted. On the one hand, there are notable differences in cultural spending over 
time. On the other hand and maybe even more significant, as the examples of Obwalden, 
Basel, and Geneva have illustrated, cantons vary not only according to the overall amount of 
cultural spending but also according to which cultural domains are subsidized most. They 
indeed represent something akin to different worlds of cultural expenditure, ranging from the 
alpine cantons focusing on sports and leisure to the city cantons with their strong emphasis on 
highbrow culture (Armingeon et al. 2004).  
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 Figure 4: Sports and leisure cultural expenditures of the Swiss cantons and their 
municipalities in 2010. 
 
 
4.2. Hybrid panel regression models 
We attempt to grasp the multifaceted situation described above by applying panel regressions 
which estimate the over-time- and between-canton-effects of determinants of cultural 
expenditures separately, but in one model (see section 3.2). The results of these hybrid panel 
regressions for the three dependent variables are depicted in table 1. It has to be noted in 
advance that three cantons (Appenzell-Ausserrhoden (AR), Appenzell-Innerrhoden (AI), and 
Grisons (GR)) had to be excluded from the models since there was no information on the 
party shares in the cantonal parliaments available in these cases. 
Beginning with the socio-structural determinants of public cultural spending (H1a-H1c), one 
sees clearly that the higher a canton’s educational level the lower is its spending on (classical) 
culture. For both overall and classical cultural spending there is a significant negative inter-
cantonal effect of the share of persons holding a tertiary degree. A corresponding over-time-
effect cannot be found. This is in line with the hegemony-distinction approach put forward by 
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Feder and Katz-Gerro (2012), pointing to the fact that elites try to limit the access to 
legitimate culture by preventing subsidies for it. This interpretation even gets stronger support 
when taking into account that no negative effect was found in the case of expenditures for 
sports and leisure, which is not part of the canon of elite legitimate culture.  
The effect of the income level of cantons is more complex. It is negative over time and 
positive between cantons, but again only in the case of overall and classical cultural 
expenditures. Hence, even though “richer” cantons feature more classical cultural spending in 
a comparative perspective, their expenditure decreases the richer they become over time. The 
arts provision approach with regard to income elites, then, can only be partly accepted; it is 
true in an inter-cantonal sense for the observational period under study here. But over time, 
and most notably in light of the negative effect of educational level, the empirical results 
speak more for the hegemony distinction perspective.  
Taking a look at the age structure one can conclude that a canton spends more on culture the 
higher the share of younger people in it gets over time. Thus, H1c could be considered as 
confirmed. The fact, however, that this overall-effect is mostly by virtue of spending on sports 
and leisure does not support the assumption that families value culture as legacy for their 
children. It rather seems to be the case that younger people facilitate cultural goods and 
services they can immediately make use of. In general these results show that the social 
structural make up of a canton is of great importance for its cultural policy.  
Let’s now turn to the political sphere and, first of all, to the influence of party ideologies. At 
first sight it seems that the share of both left-wing (SP) and christian-democratic (CVP) voters 
are in an inter-cantonal perspective positively associated with the amount of overall cultural 
expenditures. However, these effects are quite small so that they could not be identified with 
the same certainty in both sub-domains individually. On the other hand, it is consistently 
found for all cultural domains that increasing shares of christian-democratic (CVP) voters 
lead to decreasing public cultural expenditures over time. The same is true in the case of right-
wing (SVP) voters, but only for classical culture. The share of liberal (FDP) voters, then, 
yields a negative inter-cantonal and a positive over-time effect. Hence, cultural expenditures 
(primarily for sports and leisure) rise after the FDP has gained weight in cantonal elections, 
but cantons with lower liberal party shares still exhibit higher public subsidies for (classical) 
culture. All in all, parties’ influence on cultural spending cannot readily be assessed. The most 
reliable result is a rather negative (i.e. impeding) influence of conservative and right-wing 
parties, leading to a refusal of hypothesis H2a. What is perfectly clear, on the other hand, is 
that electoral cycles (H2b) play no role at all for cultural expenditures in Switzerland. In no 
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Table 1: Hybrid panel regression of per capita cultural expenditures of the Swiss cantons and their municipalities (in C CHF) 
  Overall (1977-2010)  Classical (1990-2010)  Sports & Leisure (1990-2010) 
 
 
Intra-cantonal 
effects  
(within/over time) 
Inter-cantonal 
effects  
(between) 
 
Intra-cantonal 
effects  
(within/over time) 
Inter-cantonal 
effects  
(between) 
 
Intra-cantonal 
effects  
(within/over time) 
Inter-cantonal 
effects  
(between) 
SO
C
IA
L 
               
Education (share tertiary) -0.03 (0.04) -0.21 (0.11)+  0.01 (0.03) -0.20 (0.10)+  -0.00 (0.04) 0.06 (0.07) 
Aggregate income PC (in M CHF) -0.03 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.02)*  -0.02 (0.00)*** 0.05 (0.02)**  -0.01 (0.01)+ 0.00 (0.01) 
Age (share 0-25) 0.21 (0.04)*** -0.05 (0.10)  0.05 (0.03) -0.17 (0.09)+  0.21 (0.05)*** 0.09 (0.07) 
               
PO
LI
TI
C
A
L 
               
SP (share in CP) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09 (0.04)*  -0.02 (0.01)* 0.03 (0.03)  0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 
CVP (share in CP) -0.07 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)*  -0.04 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.02)  -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.02) 
FDP (share in CP) 0.03 (0.01)* -0.06 (0.03)+  0.01 (0.01)+ -0.08 (0.03)**  0.03 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.02) 
SVP (share in CP) -0.04 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.04 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 
Time before CPE (in years) -0.04 (0.02)  -0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.02) 
Financial referendum (index 0-6) 0.13 (0.08)+ -0.13 (0.14)  0.01 (0.07) -0.11 (0.12)  -0.05 (0.09) -0.17 (0.09)* 
               
EC
O
N
. 
               
Total tax rev. of C&M PC  (in C CHF) 0.01 (0.01)+ 0.14 (0.03)***  0.01 (0.00)* 0.06 (0.02)*  -0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02)** 
Number of inhab. of largest municip. 1.36 (0.37)*** 0.06 (0.18)  0.53 (0.42) 0.09 (0.16)  1.38 (0.59)* -0.10 (0.11) 
𝑊𝑊 × 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖∙ of neighboring cantons) -0.24 (0.09)**  -0.59 (0.11)***  -0.24 (0.11)* 
         
          
 Intercept -1.41 (5.32)  6.82 (4.86)  -2.40 (3.41) 
 Std. Dev. within 0.573      (Null: 0.758)  0.308     (Null: 0.388)  0.441       (Null: 0.497) 
 Std. Dev. between 0.519      (Null: 2.621)  0.484     (Null: 1.761)  0.309       (Null: 0.989) 
 N (canton-years) 497  379  379 
 Clusters (cantons) 23  23  23 
 Linear random effects panel regression (ML-estimation), decomposing between- and within-effects (hybrid approach), with period controls (not displayed).  
Intra-cantonal effects (within): 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤(𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥𝑘𝑘∙𝑖𝑖); Inter-cantonal effects (between): 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏(?̅?𝑥𝑘𝑘∙𝑖𝑖). Coefficients and standard errors in brackets. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Legend: PC: Per Capita CPE: Cantonal Parliament Elections SP: Swiss social-democratic party FDP: Swiss liberal party 
 CP: Cantonal Parliament C&M: Canton & its Municipalities CVP: Swiss christian-democratic party SVP: Swiss right-wing party 
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one of the cultural domains under study does the time span to the next cantonal parliament 
election yield any significant effect. This is in line with the rather mixed empirical support for 
this hypothesis in other studies.  
H2c stated, that direct democratic institutions are negatively associated with the amount of 
cultural spending. Again, this hypothesis can only be partly confirmed. It holds in the case of 
sports and leisure where cantons with lower hurdles to direct democratic participation appear 
to have lower expenditures. In the other two models the respective coefficients are not 
statistically significant. This suggests that people make use of direct democracy rather to 
inhibit the development of cultural offerings in popular domains like sports and leisure. This 
might be due to the fact that direct democratic participation is generally biased towards the 
higher strata of society who, as has been shown before, try to conserve the distinctive value of 
classical culture.  
Finally, taking an economic perspective, one thing is as unambiguous as unsurprising: the 
higher the tax revenue of a canton, the more it spends on culture; the corresponding inter-
cantonal effects are significantly positive in all cultural domains and H3a therefore confirmed. 
When tax revenue rises, as can be seen by the positive and statistically significant intra-
cantonal effect in model 2 of table 1, it is classical cultural expenditures which especially 
benefit from this increase. Sport and leisure expenditures are unaffected by over-time changes 
in tax revenue. The latter do, in contrast, clearly profit from the growth of a canton’s central 
location, as inferred from a positive over-time effect emanating from the number of 
inhabitants of a canton’s largest municipality in model 3 of table 1. Hence, the economic 
foundation of their development over time differs between public spending on classical 
culture and public spending on sports and leisure. Whereas the former is driven by increasing 
tax revenue, the latter is dependent on the dynamic of key markets.  
Geographically, one can ascertain that cultural expenditures of neighboring cantons influence 
each other. More precisely, as the negative coefficients of the spatial lag term illustrate, 
cantons having neighbors with higher levels of cultural expenditures spend less on culture 
themselves. This is even more pronounced in the case of classical cultural expenditures, but 
also the effect on sports and leisure spending is substantial. Thus, H3c is fully confirmed. 
Calculating the same hybrid panel model separately for the eight cultural spending domains as 
dependent variables (not presented here) one finds that the negative spatial lag effect is 
strongest for libraries and monument and cultural heritage preservation.  
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5. Summary and discussion 
In this paper we took up one of the desiderata of sociology of culture, i.e. the interdisciplinary 
explanation of public funding for culture and the arts. We did so by adding a sociological 
perspective to the prevailing determinants discussed in political science and political 
economy. Since cultural policy is located at the intersection of several societal fields we 
expected its determinants to represent a complex configuration of social structural, political 
and economic-geographic factors. We studied this thesis on the basis of data on public 
spending for culture in the Swiss cantons from 1977 to 2010. This case study enabled us to 
locate the underlying causal mechanisms in their social and historical context.  
Our descriptive analysis of cultural expenditure in Switzerland shows a steady increase over 
time, however, especially at the end of our observational period, this is the case rather for 
public funding for culture in the classical sense than for sports and leisure. This increase over 
time is in line with results for other countries (Getzner 2002). Most striking are the 
comparative results on the cantonal spending patterns. On the one hand we find mostly alpine 
cantons spending only small sums on classical culture, which however generously fund sports 
and leisure and thereby confirm Harry Lime’s philippic about the supposed lack of great 
culture in Switzerland mentioned in the title of the article.. On the other hand, urban cantons 
like Basel and Geneva exhibit a rather different pattern, supporting classical culture liberally, 
in the case of Basel especially the visual arts. Hence, in a comparative perspective the 26 
Swiss cantons represent something like small worlds of cultural expenditure, changing slowly 
over time.  
Our multivariate analysis of cultural expenditure patterns over time clearly supports our main 
thesis. Public funding of culture and the arts results from a complex interplay of social 
structures, political institutions and economic-geographic patterns. 
With respect to the social structural variables we find that cantons with a higher share of 
highly educated persons exhibit lower levels of public spending for classical culture. At the 
same time, even though cantons with higher aggregate incomes spend more on classical 
culture, they spend less the richer they become over time. However, this is not true for sports 
and leisure expenditures which are quite unaffected by a canton’s educational and income 
structure. This strongly supports the hegemony distinction hypothesis for the Swiss case, 
especially because it assumes elites’ strategies of distinction to be concentrated on classical 
culture. Expenditures for sports and leisure, on the other hand, are clearly positively 
influenced by the share of persons under 25 years, i.e. a canton’s age structure. Though, this 
does not support the idea put forward in the political economy literature that cultural 
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expenditure is supported because of a bequest motive. Instead, the result indicates that cantons 
simply serve the increasing demand for sports and leisure infrastructure engendered by an 
increasing share of children and youth in their population (use value). Taken together, the fact 
that classical cultural spending is determined by the canton’s educational and income 
structure (according to a hegemony distinction logic) and sports and leisure spending by the 
canton’s age structure (according to a provision logic) clearly points to the importance of 
taking the social determinants of public spending into account.   
Looking at political institutions and parties we find some rather stable effects. In the case of 
electoral cycles this simply means that they have no effect at all. The strength of direct 
democracy, in contrast, is in a comparative perspective associated with decreasing public 
expenditures for sports and leisure. Thus, direct democratic institutions, which are 
predominantly utilized by higher social strata, are mainly employed to reduce public subsidies 
for non-classical culture. Regarding the party difference hypothesis results are not as clear-
cut. Generally, increasing electoral support for conservative (CVP) and right wing (SVP) 
parties leads to decreasing levels of public cultural spending. The same is true for left wing 
(SP) parties, but only in the case of classical culture and to a smaller degree. In contrast, 
liberal (FDP) parties’ gain in electoral support entails increasing expenditures, mainly for 
sports and leisure. However, from an inter-cantonal point of view, cantons with higher shares 
of left-wing and conservative voters still show higher levels of public cultural funding. Thus 
the party difference hypothesis receives rather ambiguous empirical support, indicating that 
Swiss parties primarily react to very specific local and regional situations in their political 
behavior.  
Finally, we took economic-geographic factors into account. As expected, cantons with better 
monetary endowments spend more on all domains of publically supported culture. Yet, 
domains differ with respect to the sources of their financial development over time. Whereas 
spending for classical culture profits from increasing tax revenues, spending for sports and 
leisure is dependent on growing markets, i.e. the size of a canton’s largest municipality. In 
addition, cantons react to the amount of spending of their neighbors. More specifically, they 
reduce their own cultural spending if neighboring cantons raise theirs, which is true for all 
cultural domains but primarily for classical culture.  
In sum, the analyses presented here contribute to a better understanding of general and 
domain-specific mechanisms of public funding for culture in Switzerland. This is underscored 
by the fact that the structural, political, economic, and geographic factors included in our 
models could explain large parts of the over-time- and between-canton variation of the 
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amount of cultural spending in several domains (compared to the respective null-models). 
Especially the comparative analysis of determinants of spending for leisure and sports on the 
one hand and classical cultural expenditure on the other hand indicated that the supporting 
mechanisms in the two fields follow clearly different logics. Whereas public funding of sports 
and leisure is stronger in cantons with a greater share of young people, with a lower level of 
direct democracy, and bigger central locations, support for classical culture is stronger in 
cantons with a smaller share of tertiary educated persons, tends to diminish, the richer a 
canton gets, and tends to increase with tax revenue. In sum, the support for classical culture 
seems to follow a hegemony distinction-approach, where educated elites attempt to restrict the 
provision of classical culture. However, disentangling these different logics requires further 
research to descend from the macro perspective taken in this paper and focus more on the 
micro mechanisms of decisions in different fields of public expenditure, e.g. by doing case 
studies on parliamentary decisions or by a comparative analysis of voting in referenda on 
culture on the one and sports and leisure on the other hand.  
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